The War in Iraq
The US consumes 25% of the world's oil production, so no matter who is in power in Iraq, the US, along with all the industrialized nations of the world, seeks its oil (law 2). UN sanctions imposed following the Persian Gulf War, severly restricted access to Iraqi oil, leading to the UN Oil-for-Food program (law 2). More Iraqi oil wound up in the US than in any other country under this program.
In 1999 the US and UK were caught spying (law 2) on Iraq whilst engaged in UNMOVIC inspections, promptly bringing those inspections to an end. UN sanctions continued, but so too did the Oil-for-Food program (law 2), from which only the Baath regime truly benefitted (law 1). Later the Ba'ath regime entered into future economic agreements (law 1) with Russia, France and Germany (law 2), which would go into effect pending the end of UN sanctions, giving these countries primary access to Iraqi oil to refine and resell to the rest of the world (law 2).
This set up a conundrum for the US: how to continue acquiring Iraqi oil following the inevitable end of sanctions (law 2), without financing the Ba'ath regime, who would certainly use oil revenue to arm itself and potentially acquire the other significant sources of oil in the region (law 1), namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran who, together produce a 1/4 of the world's oil production.
Since there was no way to diminish the US demand for oil (law 1), and because inspections had already ended due to the spying (law 2) scandal of 1999, the threat and execution of war against Iraq and the Ba'ath regime provided the US with a way to continue to consume Iraq's oil (law 2), without posing a threat to other sources of oil in the region (law 1).
The opposition of France, Germany and Russia resulted from a desire to proceed with their economic agreements with Iraq (law 2), and gain primary access to their oil at the conclusion of UN sanctions.
The reasons behind the execution of and opposition to, the US war in Iraq are purely economic (law 5). Politically the US regime clearly used the threat of terrorism as justification (law 1), but it is clear that the real reasons for supporting or opposing the war had little to do with with a concern for the new doctrine of pre-emption (laws 1 & 2) or a concern for the human and economic cost of the war for the Iraqi people (law 2) or preventing terrorism (laws 1&2).
In 1999 the US and UK were caught spying (law 2) on Iraq whilst engaged in UNMOVIC inspections, promptly bringing those inspections to an end. UN sanctions continued, but so too did the Oil-for-Food program (law 2), from which only the Baath regime truly benefitted (law 1). Later the Ba'ath regime entered into future economic agreements (law 1) with Russia, France and Germany (law 2), which would go into effect pending the end of UN sanctions, giving these countries primary access to Iraqi oil to refine and resell to the rest of the world (law 2).
This set up a conundrum for the US: how to continue acquiring Iraqi oil following the inevitable end of sanctions (law 2), without financing the Ba'ath regime, who would certainly use oil revenue to arm itself and potentially acquire the other significant sources of oil in the region (law 1), namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran who, together produce a 1/4 of the world's oil production.
Since there was no way to diminish the US demand for oil (law 1), and because inspections had already ended due to the spying (law 2) scandal of 1999, the threat and execution of war against Iraq and the Ba'ath regime provided the US with a way to continue to consume Iraq's oil (law 2), without posing a threat to other sources of oil in the region (law 1).
The opposition of France, Germany and Russia resulted from a desire to proceed with their economic agreements with Iraq (law 2), and gain primary access to their oil at the conclusion of UN sanctions.
The reasons behind the execution of and opposition to, the US war in Iraq are purely economic (law 5). Politically the US regime clearly used the threat of terrorism as justification (law 1), but it is clear that the real reasons for supporting or opposing the war had little to do with with a concern for the new doctrine of pre-emption (laws 1 & 2) or a concern for the human and economic cost of the war for the Iraqi people (law 2) or preventing terrorism (laws 1&2).